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Abstract-- Recently there have been several historical changes 
in electricity networks that necessitate the development of 
Demand Side Management (DSM). The main objective of DSM is 
to achieve an aggregated consumption pattern that is efficient in 
terms of energy cost reduction, welfare maximization and/or 
satisfaction of network constraints. This is generally envisaged by 
encouraging electricity use at low-peak times. In this paper, we 
consider a system with strategic, price-anticipating consumers 
with private preferences that choose their electricity consumption 
patterns so as to maximize their own benefit. In this context, we 
take on the problem of coordinating the consumers’ consumption 
behavior without sacrificing their welfare (Quality of 
Experience). In order to tackle this problem, we draw on 
concepts of indirect mechanism design and propose a DSM 
architecture that is able to fulfill specific system-wide constraints 
(e.g. energy cost reduction) and simultaneously achieve welfare 
that is very close to optimal. The proposed billing rule preserves 
both the budget-balance and the individual rationality 
properties. According to our evaluation, the proposed DSM 
architecture achieves a close to optimal allocation (1%-3% gap), 
compared to an “optimal” system that would use central 
optimization of user loads without user consensus or protection 
of their privacy. 
 
Index Terms--Demand Side Management, smart grid, 
mechanism design, constraint satisfaction. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
odern electricity networks face a number of important 
developments and subsequent challenges. These are 
technical (e.g. supply-demand balance and network stability 
upon high RES penetration), financial (e.g. market 
liberalization, bottom-up financing) and political (e.g. 
democratization of energy production systems and energy 
independency of communities and countries). Energy 
utilization and energy efficiency is at the center of attention in 
such systems. In particular, Demand Side Management (DSM) 
refers to the idea of driving electricity consumption at times 
where it is more efficient to serve it. As analyzed in [1], 
residential participation in DSM is commonly envisaged via 
aggregated participation because of implementation and 
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scalability issues. An Electricity Service Provider (ESP) is 
considered for the role of aggregating and coordinating the 
users’ actions. Applying direct control over the end-users’ 
loads is not an attractive option since it comes with massive 
consumer dissatisfaction and arbitrary load prioritization, 
which leads to loss of social welfare. Along with the trend of 
liberalization of the electricity market, principles of economics 
that are already applied in most markets are now becoming 
more relevant to the electricity market as well. Thus, the state 
of the art approach to DSM is to motivate electricity 
consumers towards economically efficient consumption 
patterns by providing monetary incentives. That is, consumers 
are expected to modify their consumption patterns voluntarily 
in response to pricing signals.  
Nevertheless, each user is typically trying to optimize 
his/her own objective, which may or may not be in line with 
the social objective. A particular stream of game theory called 
mechanism design is essentially the tool for designing rules 
(namely, an allocation rule through which end users determine 
their consumption pattern, and a billing rule through which 
their bills are determined) for systems with strategic 
participants holding private information, such that the system 
at equilibrium has good performance guarantees.  
Modern ESPs in the era of the smart grid have to embed 
DSM in their business models. A DSM architecture includes 
the mechanism (allocation rule and billing rule) through which 
the DSM participants (namely, the users and the ESP) interact 
as well as the local algorithm through which each participant 
decided his/her actions. Through a carefully designed DSM 
architecture, we can hopefully bring the system to an efficient 
state, even though the designer does not directly control the 
decision variables. According to our requirement analysis [2], 
a DSM architecture has to fulfill three properties, described in 
the following subsections. 
A. Welfare Maximization 
The first property is the maximization of the welfare (i.e. the 
aggregated users’ utility). The utility of a user/energy 
consumer is defined as the difference between: i) a metric 
(noted here as valuation function) that quantifies how much 
the user valuates/appreciates a specific energy consumption 
profile/pattern and ii) the bill that the user has to pay for it. 
Maximizing the welfare through mechanism design can be 
relatively easy or really challenging, depending on the 
assumptions made about the actual users’ behavior and 
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preferences. Making strong assumptions on the form of user’s 
preferences makes the system conducive to theoretically 
strong results but the validity of these assumptions is often 
questionable [3]. Also, a common assumption regarding the 
user’s behavior refers to the user being modeled as a price-
taker, which means not considering the effect of his/her own 
decisions on the electricity price. While this might be relevant 
for large systems, in emerging energy communities and 
decentralized systems this assumption no longer holds and the 
user might be a price-anticipator. The latter user model only 
makes things more complicated when it comes to welfare 
maximization and it is avoided in most of the literature (see 
[4] and references therein). In contrast, in the present paper 
users are price anticipators. 
Finally, the aggregated users’ utility alone is not enough. A 
typically desired property is the property of individual 
rationality. A mechanism is called individually rational if each 
and every user benefits from participating in it. In other words, 
at equilibrium, each user is better-off participating in the 
DSM, rather than not participating. 
B. Budget-balance 
We consider a benevolent ESP that acts on behalf of the users 
and not against them. Τhe ESP is not a profit maximizing 
entity but a representative of the users and their interests. 
Budget-balance refers to the fact that the mechanism is not 
required to subsidize the DSM participation nor does it extract 
a surplus from the users, but only divides the system’s energy 
cost among users. Indicative use cases of this business model 
are: i) the case of energy cooperatives [5], ii) public 
companies [6] around public authorities acting as ESPs, iii) 
private monopolistic companies with regulated profit margins, 
iv) virtual associations of users [7] v) islanded energy 
communities and vi) any other use case in which the ESP’s 
primary interest is the welfare of the users in its portfolio. 
C. Constraint Satisfaction 
The third property is the coordination of the aggregated users’ 
consumption in order to satisfy system-wide constraints. Such 
constraints indicatively aim to  
Case a) keep the aggregated consumption below a certain 
threshold at all times or  
Case b) keep the system’s overall cost within certain margins.  
The necessity of satisfying such constraints is met in many 
use cases in modern smart grids which include: 
1) Enhancing the self-sufficiency of the community 
2) Keeping islanded microgrids economically viable [8] 
3) Mitigate suppliers’ exercise of market power by taking 
coordinated action to reduce the demand in the face of such 
situations [9] 
4) Meeting the physical network’s constraints by 
implementing the DSO’s orders 
5) Enhancing the community’s participation in flexibility 
markets [10, 11] 
6) Reducing CO2 emissions and respecting modern legal 
frameworks towards energy cost reduction [12] 
7) Enhancing RES penetration by adapting demand to the 
intermittent generation [13] 
From a technical point of view, satisfying a system-wide 
constraint can be a challenge. In particular, constraint 
satisfaction typically depends on the aggregated consumption 
profile of end users. This couples the system’s decision 
variables that are controlled by different users, which brings a 
fair amount of complications in the underlying n-person game 
[14]. The proposed DSM architecture can be used for both 
cases a) and b) of constraints described above. In this paper, 
we present a theoretical analysis for case a), which is the most 
difficult of the two but in the evaluation section we present 
simulations for both cases. 
Further requirements might apply depending on the context 
and the particular business model of the system. Designing a 
DSM architecture that exhibits specific properties tailored to 
each specific business model is an open research topic. In the 
context of SOCIALENERGY [15] we design allocation and 
billing rules for various settings, including real-time 
consumption curtailments ([16], [17]) and day-ahead 
consumption scheduling ([18] and the present paper). Finally, 
various studies have proposed solutions for aligning the user’s 
day-ahead consumption schedule with his/her updated real-
time needs ([19]-[22]). 
Summarizing the above, the contribution of this paper is the 
design of a DSM architecture that is able to meet system-wide 
constraints (e.g. energy cost reduction) and at the same time 
achieve users’ welfare very close to optimal. The proposed 
scheme also preserves both the budget-balance and the 
individual rationality properties. 
II.  RELATED WORK 
In the DSM context described above, we set three main 
requirements for the proposed mechanism. We need a DSM 
architecture that: a) achieves close to optimal users’ welfare, 
b) preserves the budget-balance property, and c) provides the 
ESP with the ability to control the overall consumption cost 
(satisfaction of a system constraint).  
The welfare-maximizing requirement is highly dependent 
on user modeling. That is, a theoretically optimal allocation 
can be achieved, only under certain assumptions on the users’ 
preferences representation. DSM studies can be categorized 
into three main branches with respect to how they model user 
preferences. 
The first branch includes many works (e.g. [22]-[32]) that 
consider users who exhibit no preference towards the 
consumption pattern, as long as their whole load is satisfied 
within a defined time interval. In simple words, users set 
constraints on their consumption but there are no preferences 
among the time intervals as long as the consumption 
constraints are met. 
The second branch of the literature (e.g. [1] and [33]-[39]), 
considers user preferences and price sensitive consumption 
patterns. The study in [33], approaches the solution with a 
regret-based algorithm, [35] with Simulated Annealing, and 
the rest of the works typically formulate a convex optimization 
problem and reach the optimal solution by solving its dual 
problem. During this process, the ESP and the users solve 
their local problems and exchange messages. Under the 
assumption of price-taking users, the final allocation is 
welfare-maximizing. 
In the third branch (e.g. [4], [40]) this assumption has been 
relaxed and users are considered as price-anticipators, that is, 
they consider the effect of their actions on the prices. In this 
case, the dual approach no longer achieves welfare 
maximization, as analyzed in [41, chapter 21]. So, the studies 
in this third branch opt for a Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) 
mechanism. However, the practical applicability of the VCG 
mechanism is highly debated because it is a direct mechanism 
(requires users to reveal their preferences to the ESP), which 
raises not only privacy but also representation issues (see [19] 
for a more detailed analysis). 
From the above three user model research branches, only 
the first one preserves the budget-balance property. The 
convex optimization approach typically ends up with the 
market-clearing prices and extracts a big surplus from the 
users, especially when the latter are price-takers. Also, the 
VCG mechanism is inherently not budget-balanced. 
Finally, constraint satisfaction complicates things when it 
comes to indirect mechanisms. This is because typical market-
clearing approaches are often not suitable for constraint 
satisfaction, especially when the constraints couple the 
optimization variables. Thus, the works that induce some kind 
of controllability, either relax the welfare-maximization 
requirement [42], or the user preferences modeling [43], or 
adopt a central optimization approach [44], [45] with a 
consequent assumption of direct control on user loads. Also, 
dual optimization approaches can apply some control on the 
consumption patterns by manipulating the prices, but that 
comes at the expense of high user dissatisfaction. 
In this work we present a DSM architecture for price-
anticipating users that: i) achieves near optimal welfare 
(reaches 91%-99% of the optimal value), ii) is theoretically 
proven to preserve the budget balance and the individual 
rationality properties, iii) provides the ESP with 
controllability over the overall system’s cost (which is a 
coupling and quadratic constraint). To the best of our 
knowledge, this is the first work to satisfy all three of the 
requirements described above.  
III.  SYSTEM MODEL 
We consider an electricity market comprised of an Electricity 
Service Provider (ESP) and a set   *       + of self-
interested consumers, hereinafter referred to as users. We also 
consider a discrete representation of time, where continuous 
time is divided into timeslots    , of equal duration  , 
where   *       + represents the scheduling horizon. A 
user possesses a number of controllable appliances where each 
appliance bears an energy demand. We consider each 
appliance as one user, for ease of presentation and without loss 
of generality. Thus, we will use the terms “user” and 
“appliance” interchangeably throughout.  
User & Appliance modeling 
An appliance   requires an amount of energy for operation. 
For example, if an appliance’s operating power is 1W, and 
    , then the energy that the appliance consumes in one 
timeslot of operation is    . This energy consumption is 
controllable via a decision variable   
 , which denotes the 
amount of energy consumed by appliance    , at timeslot 
   . Throughout this paper we assume   
   . Each 
appliance   is characterized by  
i) a feasible consumption set, defined by a set of constraints 
on   
 , which is presented below and  
ii) a valuation function of the energy that   consumes 
throughout  . 
The aforementioned set of constraints includes upper and 
lower consumption bounds, restrictions on consumption 
timeslots and a coupling constraint. More specifically, 
appliance i cannot consume more than an upper bound   , that 
is, 
    
              (1) 
An appliance   also bears a set of timeslots     , in 
which its operation is feasible (e.g., an electric vehicle can be 
plugged in only at timeslots during which its owner is home): 
  
                       (2) 
We denote an appliance’s feasible consumption profile, as 
a vector    *  
    
      
 +    , where   
  satisfies (1), (2) 
and     
  denotes the feasible set for  ’s consumption 
profile: 
   *   |   
            ( ) ( )     +      (3) 
Finally, the     matrix containing all users’ 
consumptions at all timeslots is denoted as 
  *          +    where   *  +    denotes the 
Cartesian product of the   ’s. 
The valuation function is expressed in monetary units ($), 
and it is private (the user does not share it with the ESP or 
other users). It is generally a function of    and expresses the 
maximum amount of money that a user is willing to pay for 
the operation profile   . The valuation function   (  ) can 
take various forms, depending on the appliance. Let    
denote the m-vector with all of its elements equal to zero. We 
adopt some common assumptions ([1], [4], [34]-[39]) based 
on microeconomics theory [46] on the form of   (  ): 
Assumption 1: Ζero consumption brings zero value to the user: 
  ( 
 )           (4a) 
Assumption 2: Consuming more does not make the user less 
happy. That is, for two arbitrary vectors     ,    , we have:  
  (   )    (       )                  (4b) 
Assumption 3: (concavity) for two arbitrary vectors     ,     
and for any scalar      : 
   (   )  (   )  (   )    (      (   )     ) (4c) 
Finally, the user’s utility is defined as the difference 
between the user’s valuation for his/her consumption profile 
and the bill he/she has to pay for it: 
  (  )    (  )    (  )      (5) 
System Cost & Electricity Billing 
The ESP is responsible for purchasing energy from the grid 
and delivering it to the users. We assume that the ESP faces a 
per-timeslot cost that is a strictly increasing function   ( ) of 
the aggregated consumption ∑   
 
   . In particular, quadratic 
or piecewise linear functions are widely used in the literature 
[22]-[39], to model the generation cost of marginal units as 
explained in [47]. We present the case for quadratic cost: 
  (∑   
 
   )    (∑   
 
   )
      (6) 
As explained in the introduction, we consider a use case 
where the ESP needs to be able to control the system’s cost so 
as to keep it below a certain threshold     . Moreover, we 
consider a benevolent ESP that acts on behalf of the users and 
not against them. We assume that, for the scheduling horizon, 
the ESP collects the financial cost   which is: 
  ∑   (∑   
 
   )          (7) 
by applying a billing rule  (  ) to each user. We state some 
requirements for  (  ): 
Requirement 1: The sum of the users’ bills should add up to 
the system’s cost: 
∑  (  )      
 (∑   
 
   )         (8) 
Eq. (8) captures the budget balance property analyzed in the 
introduction. 
Requirement 2: At equilibrium, each user should have weakly 
positive utility.  
This is equivalent to stating that each user should be better-off 
participating in the mechanism rather than not participating. 
This is equivalent to the individual rationality property. 
ESP-user interaction & implementation 
We assume a communication network, built on top of the 
power grid, allowing the ESP and the users to exchange 
messages. In particular, in order for an indirect mechanism to 
be implemented, we assume that the users can respond to 
demand queries.  That is, the ESP provides the user with the 
necessary billing data and the user is expected to respond with 
his/her demand, that is, with the desired consumption vector 
   that maximizes the user’s utility   (  ) given from Eq. (5). 
Since an efficient allocation involves a certain degree of 
coordination among users, it may take a number of message 
exchanges between the ESP and each user to converge to 
equilibrium. For this reason, we expect the user to respond to 
each demand query in a reasonable amount of time. A 
commonly accepted response time in computer science is a 
time that is, in the worst case, polynomial in bits of precision 
required. For the latter property to hold, the billing rule should 
be simple enough. A sufficient condition that fulfills this 
property is captured in a third requirement, which is: 
Requirement 3: The user’s bill  (  ), is convex in   . 
To justify the sufficiency of Requirement 3, recall the 
definition of the user’s utility from Eq. (5). The first term is 
concave by Assumption 3. A convex  (  ) makes the user’s 
utility   (  ) concave in   . Thus, the user’s response to a 
demand query becomes a convex optimization problem, which 
is tractable. 
IV.  PROBLEM FORMULATION 
In this section, we formalize the problem to be solved, which 
is maximizing the aggregated users’ utility (Eq. 9): 
   
         
∑ (  (  )   (  ))       (9) 
while keeping the system’s cost below a predefined threshold 
    . By using Eq. (8) in Eq. (9) we have: 
            *∑ ,  (  )-     ∑ , 
 (∑   
 
   )-   +    (10) 
      ∑ ,  (∑   
 
   )-              (10a) 
Constraint (10a) couples the variables   
  across both     
and    . We will demonstrate that this is a standard convex 
optimization problem where a concave function is maximized 
over a convex set        that is defined by the inequality 
constraints (1), (10a) and the equality constraint (2).  
Lemma 1: The problem defined by Eq. (10) under constraints 
(1), (2) and (10a) is a convex optimization problem. In 
particular: 
i) The objective function  ( )  ∑ ,  (  )-    
 ∑ ,  (∑   
 
   )-    is concave in    . 
ii) Inequality constraint functions (1), (10a) are convex in 
     
iii) Equality constraint functions (2) are affine in     
Proof: 
i) Since ∑ ,  (  )-    is a sum of concave functions in 
subspaces of  , it is concave in  . Let    be the all-ones n-
dimensional vector and      the all-ones     dimensional 
matrix. Let also    (  
    
      
 )  be the vector containing 
all the users’ consumptions in timeslot  . Then 
  (∑   
 
   )    ((  )
     )    (  )      
   
is convex because it is a quadratic function and      is 
positive semi-definite. Therefore,   ∑ ,  (∑   
 
   )-     is 
concave in  , as a sum of concave functions in subspaces of 
  and (i) is true because   is a sum of concave functions.  
ii) Constraint (1) is trivially convex and (10a) is also convex 
as shown in the second term of   
iii) Constraint (2) is trivially affine, for all    , in a subspace 
of , and so it is also affine in .                         
Thus, problem (10) is convex and has a global optimal 
solution. If valuations   (  )    (  
     ) were known, it 
could be solved through the use of an interior point method. 
However,   (  ) is private. Moreover, we assume strategic 
users who opt for maximizing their own utility, that is, 
         
     
*  (  )   (  )+    (11) 
The latter objective is not necessarily aligned with the 
social objective and depends on the billing rule  (  ). Since 
the cost function couples the users’ variables   ,     , a 
user’s utility depends not only on her/his own profile but also 
on the other users’ consumption choices. This latter fact brings 
problem (10) in the realm of game theory. In order to bring the 
system to an equilibrium that optimizes (10), we will draw on 
the concepts of mechanism design. 
We consider a game-theoretic framework, where the ESP 
announces the billing rule and users iteratively select their 
preferred allocations, thus formulating the following game  . 
Definition of game    
 Players: users in   
 Strategies: each user selects her/his   , according to (11) 
 Payoffs: a user’s payoff is his/her utility as defined in (5) 
Since problem (10) naturally prioritizes users with higher 
valuation for energy allocation, we need to prevent users from 
faking a high   (  ). This is the role of the billing rule. The 
Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism has been proven to 
be the unique welfare-maximizing mechanism that makes it a 
dominant strategy for each user, to truthfully declare his/her 
local valuation. Unfortunately, VCG-like mechanisms are not 
useful here since they violate the budget-balance property 
(Requirement 2) and also come with a number of other 
problems as explained in the introduction. In what follows, we 
opt for designing a DSM architecture which includes: 
a) an indirect and individually rational mechanism, including 
a budget-balanced billing rule, implemented in best-
response strategies. Although we have to relax the welfare-
maximization property, we are actually able to reach a near-
optimal solution.  
b) an algorithm at the ESP side, which iteratively decides a 
parameter of the billing rule, thus providing the ESP with 
online controllability over the system’s cost, so that 
constraint (10a) is satisfied at equilibrium. 
V.  PROPOSED DSM ARCHITECTURE 
In this section, we present the proposed DSM architecture that 
fulfills the aforementioned requirements. The presentation is 
complemented with the presentation of the theorems that 
prove analytically that the requirements we have set are 
fulfilled. In more detail, we developed a DSM architecture 
such that: 
a) game Γ admits to a Nash Equilibrium (NE) 
b) users’ actions converge to NE via best-response dynamics 
c) the DSM mechanism provides the ESP with controllability 
over the system’s cost, which means that the ESP brings the 
system to an equilibrium that respects constraint (10a), in case 
that it is possible. 
d) the allocation at equilibrium is as close as possible to the 
optimal value of problem (10).  
A. The billing rule 
Best-response dynamics means that, at each iteration, each 
user chooses his/her strategy assuming the strategies     of 
other users to be constant. Thus, from a user’s perspective, at a 
certain iteration, his/her bill only depends on his/her own 
choice of   . The following equation presents the proposed 
billing rule: 
 (  )  ∑ [  
  
  .∑   
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∑   
 
   
]      [∑ [  
  ∑ (  
 )   ]    
∑ 0∑ .  
  ∑   
 
   /   1   
 
]          (12) 
The first term of the sum is identical to existing billing rules. 
The second term has the purpose to reward/penalize 
flexibility/inflexibility (ability of user   to modify energy 
consumption profile). The value of   is iteratively updated by 
the ESP. The rationale of Eq. (12) is that it penalizes users for 
synchronizing their loads with others and uses the penalties for 
rewarding users who counter-balance the aggregated 
consumption by consuming their load at off-peak timeslots. 
With respect to the billing rule, we state the following lemma: 
Lemma 2: For constant values of    , the bill  (  ), given by 
Eq. (12), is strictly convex in   . 
The proof of Lemma 2 is given in Appendix A.               
The user communicates his/her demand profile    to the 
ESP and receives the respective bill  (  ). Since problem (11) 
is convex (by Lemma 1 and Assumption 3) the user can apply 
a gradient projection method to compute his/her best response. 
Next, we analyze the properties of game  : 
Theorem 1: A Nash Equilibrium for game   exists and is 
unique. Furthermore, best-response dynamics converges to the 
Nash Equilibrium strategy vector. 
The proof of Theorem 1 is given in Appendix B.                    
The second term of the sum in (12) introduces a price-
discrimination component among users with different levels of 
flexibility. The ESP can control the magnitude of this 
discrimination by adjusting parameter    as will be analyzed in 
subsection B. of this section. Thus, by increasing  , users are 
increasingly incentivized to modify their consumption 
patterns. Note that   does not increase the bills in general but 
only controls the way that the system’s cost is shared among 
users. This provides an intuition on the way (12) keeps the 
system budget balanced, and is proved formally below. 
Theorem 2: The billing rule  (  ), given by Eq. (12), satisfies 
the budget balance property. 
The proof is given in Appendix C.                  
Furthermore, for the proposed billing rule given by Eq. 
(12), we also verify Requirement 2. 
Theorem 3: Game Γ, in equilibrium, satisfies the individual 
rationality property. 
The proof is given in Appendix D.                     
B. The ESP’s algorithm for constraint satisfaction 
While the users are concerned with maximizing their utility, 
the ESP is responsible for satisfying constraint (10a). As 
discussed earlier, the ESP controls the system’s cost via 
parameter  . A low value of   would lead to high energy cost, 
while a large value of   would have a negative impact on the 
welfare. Thus, the proposed DSM architecture also needs an 
algorithm for the ESP to identify the appropriate choice of  , 
which brings the system to an allocation that respects 
constraint (10a) with the least possible sacrifice on the users’ 
utility. Since the ESP is agnostic of the users’ valuation 
functions, determining the appropriate   calls for a global 
optimization approach. We opt for a Simulated Annealing 
(SA) method for determining  . The entire DSM procedure is 
depicted in table 1. 
Table 1 The proposed DSM procedure 
1 set    
         ,    ,   ,   ,    
2 Repeat 
3     Repeat 
4            for     
5                  calculates best-response   (  ) from (11) 
6      until Nash Equilibrium 
7 ESP calculates cost at NE (  ) 
8    (       )
 
 (         )
 
 
9       
10           
  
11 ESP determines next    as a function of               
12 
Until 
∑   
 
     
   
   
Parameter    is the so called “temperature” of the SA 
algorithm. In line 11, the SA algorithm determines the next 
value of    based on a probabilistic calculation, which is not 
presented here. 
VI.  APPENDIX 
A) Proof of Lemma 2  
We denote by    the Hessian matrix of function  (  ), 
defined in Eq. (12). We have to show that   is positive 
definite. By substituting Eq. (6) in Eq. (12), we have 
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By taking the derivatives: 
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Thus,       (  ) is positive definite. 
B) Proof of Theorem 1 
a) The user’s payoff is his/her utility given by eq. (5). The 
first term is concave in    by Assumption 3. The second term 
is strictly convex in    by Lemma 1. Hence, for   
   ,   (  ) 
is strictly concave in   . Since this holds for every user, we 
have that   is a strictly concave n-person game. Thus, by [48, 
th.1], we have that a NE exists. 
b) By [49], it suffices to show that   is an exact potential 
game with a concave potential function. Indeed, consider the 
function: 
 ( )  ∑   (  )    ∑ 2
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∑ ,(  
 ) -   -   
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 ∑ (  
  ∑ (  
 )   )   3  
Function  ( ) has the property of potential: 
    ( )       (  )      
Moreover, ∑   (  )     is concave in   (concave in    by 
Assumption 3 and zero in        ). Thus, it suffices to prove 
that the term 
    ∑ 2
 
 
   ,(∑   
 
   )
  ∑ ,(  
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 (   )
  
    
∑ [  
  ∑ (  
 )   ]   3  
is also concave, or equivalently that     is convex.  
It is    (   )       (  )  which yields    
 (   )  
   
   (  )    
  which by Lemma 1 is positive definite. 
Hence,    is also concave in  , since its Hessian  
   
  
           (*  
 +   
 ) is a block diagonal positive 
definite matrix. Hence   is concave in   (            ) 
as a sum of concave functions in    
c) Since the potential function is concave and players 
maximize, it directly follows that best-response dynamics 
converges to the unique NE. 
C) Proof of Theorem 2 
It suffices to show that 
∑  (  )    ∑  , 
 (∑   
 
   )-     
By substituting  (  ) from Eq. (12), we have 
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which completes the proof. 
D) Proof of Theorem 3 
The root vector   
     {  
      }      for which 
 (  
    )   , is derived by solving from Eq. (12): 
  
       
 
   
[ ∑ (  
 )    ( (   )     )  
 √[∑ (  
 )    ( (   )     )]
 
      ]  
Setting ∑   
 
    ( (   )     )    and       , we 
get 
  
       
 
   
[     √     ]  
which means that there is always exactly one    
        . By 
Assumptions 1 and 2, we have   (  
      )   . Thus, from Eq. 
(5) we get that   (  
    )   . This means that each user’s 
utility is weakly positive, which completes the proof. 
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